Shalini Parekh
Chicago: The trial of David Headley and his co-accused in the Mumbai terror attacks, Tahawwur Rana, in a Chicago courtroom is revealing startling new details every day. A day after his confession about working with Pakistan’s ISI was made public, it was revealed that Headley had discussed his plans to infiltrate the Shiv Sena with Rana and attack its offices in Mumbai.
Headley also described his surveillance of the Shiv Sena headquarters in Mumbai and his friendship with a Shiv Sena leader. ISI’s Major Iqbal and Sajid reviewed his contacts and expressed amazement at his entry into the Shiv Sena complex and his befriending a Sena associate, while venting their mutual hatred for Shiv Sena— “a right wing extremist organization with terrorist links’’, as he put it. They were pleased that he was able to develop a relationship with Shiv Sena, so they could target that organization as well. However, Shiv Sena refuted terror Headley’s claims.
In 2008, on his return to Pakistan, Headley had talked to ISI’s Sajid about a new list of targets for Mumbai— Maharashtra State Police Headquarters and Siddhi Vinayak Temple being two. Major Iqbal, also of ISI, wanted him to add Mumbai Airport and Chabad House— a stop-over for Israeli visitors— to this list. He also surveyed the Central Train Station, Victoria Terminus, the Oberoi and the Leoplold Cafe.
At the Siddhi Vinayak Temple, he bought wrist bands worn by Hindus so that the attackers could leave undetected. He also had a GPS device to mark all these locations in South Bombay.
In several exhibits displayed in court, Headley was asked to identify many of these locations in Mumbai. In a calm voice, he described the slew of locations where he conducted surveillance.
On his return to Pakistan, he was asked to join the attackers. Major Iqbal told him that he did not like the egress option, where the attackers would leave once the mission was accomplished. He preferred the stronghold option, where the attackers would fight till the end. The idea of giving phones to each one of the attackers was also discussed.
In October 2008, both Sajid and Major Iqbal discussed the September attempt to attack Mumbai, which had failed. The plan to hijack an Indian fishing boat to land on Indian shores was discussed, but their boat hit the rocks. A subsequent attempt also failed.
Major Iqbal was also irritated that the attack on Danish Newspaper ‘Jylands Posten’ had not occurred yet.
“I was pleased,’’ Headley said in court when he first heard that the Mumbai attacks had begun. He said he was also concerned that the plans had not leaked. He also suggested that events in Gujarat and Kashmir were a cause for jihadist retaliation by Lashkar.
In several email exhibits presented by the prosecution as evidence, Rana was shown as being updated or apprised about Headley’s activities. How much or how little Rana really knew about this trail of terror is the real subject of this trial.
Chicago: The trial of David Headley and his co-accused in the Mumbai terror attacks, Tahawwur Rana, in a Chicago courtroom is revealing startling new details every day. A day after his confession about working with Pakistan’s ISI was made public, it was revealed that Headley had discussed his plans to infiltrate the Shiv Sena with Rana and attack its offices in Mumbai.
Headley also described his surveillance of the Shiv Sena headquarters in Mumbai and his friendship with a Shiv Sena leader. ISI’s Major Iqbal and Sajid reviewed his contacts and expressed amazement at his entry into the Shiv Sena complex and his befriending a Sena associate, while venting their mutual hatred for Shiv Sena— “a right wing extremist organization with terrorist links’’, as he put it. They were pleased that he was able to develop a relationship with Shiv Sena, so they could target that organization as well. However, Shiv Sena refuted terror Headley’s claims.
In 2008, on his return to Pakistan, Headley had talked to ISI’s Sajid about a new list of targets for Mumbai— Maharashtra State Police Headquarters and Siddhi Vinayak Temple being two. Major Iqbal, also of ISI, wanted him to add Mumbai Airport and Chabad House— a stop-over for Israeli visitors— to this list. He also surveyed the Central Train Station, Victoria Terminus, the Oberoi and the Leoplold Cafe.
At the Siddhi Vinayak Temple, he bought wrist bands worn by Hindus so that the attackers could leave undetected. He also had a GPS device to mark all these locations in South Bombay.
In several exhibits displayed in court, Headley was asked to identify many of these locations in Mumbai. In a calm voice, he described the slew of locations where he conducted surveillance.
On his return to Pakistan, he was asked to join the attackers. Major Iqbal told him that he did not like the egress option, where the attackers would leave once the mission was accomplished. He preferred the stronghold option, where the attackers would fight till the end. The idea of giving phones to each one of the attackers was also discussed.
In October 2008, both Sajid and Major Iqbal discussed the September attempt to attack Mumbai, which had failed. The plan to hijack an Indian fishing boat to land on Indian shores was discussed, but their boat hit the rocks. A subsequent attempt also failed.
Major Iqbal was also irritated that the attack on Danish Newspaper ‘Jylands Posten’ had not occurred yet.
“I was pleased,’’ Headley said in court when he first heard that the Mumbai attacks had begun. He said he was also concerned that the plans had not leaked. He also suggested that events in Gujarat and Kashmir were a cause for jihadist retaliation by Lashkar.
In several email exhibits presented by the prosecution as evidence, Rana was shown as being updated or apprised about Headley’s activities. How much or how little Rana really knew about this trail of terror is the real subject of this trial.
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