CERN’s experiments with subatomic particles showcase the wonders of science. But when shorn of ethical underpinnings, the scientific mission also betrays human hubris. Consider biomedical experiments in the US and Netherlands that have caused the H5N1 virus – which causes bird flu – to mutate into a lethal strain. A virus believed to spread between humans via contact has gone airborne. Virologists involved lamely say the knowledge acquired will aid the search for vaccines. Do these projected gains outweigh the costs in terms of loss of life that’ll incur should the mutated version ever get out of laboratory confines? Clearly not – else, US authorities wouldn’t ask reputed scientific journals to withhold details about the research findings in a desperate attempt at damage control.
Scientists may have upped the risks of a global pandemic since, no matter how hermetically sealed, the virus could leak into public spaces by human error or design. The prospect of terrorists exploiting information about H5N1 can’t be dismissed as outlandish in the post-9/11 world. More so, since bioterrorism’s effectiveness has been demonstrated in the past. In 1995, the extremist group Aum Shinrikyo released sarin gas in a Tokyo subway, killing 13 and badly injuring over 50. In 2001, letters bearing anthrax spores arrived in the US Congress and media establishments, killing five and indisposing 17. An H5N1 outbreak would cause far greater havoc. The issue clearly highlights the need for upgraded global biosecurity and better safeguarding of deadly viruses in labs. Given the scientific community’s apparent failure to self-regulate against excesses, no-holds-barred experimentation must also be legislated against and violations punished. If experiments on or cloning of humans are outlawed as morally reprehensible, can spawning of man-made killer diseases be legitimate science?
Scientists may have upped the risks of a global pandemic since, no matter how hermetically sealed, the virus could leak into public spaces by human error or design. The prospect of terrorists exploiting information about H5N1 can’t be dismissed as outlandish in the post-9/11 world. More so, since bioterrorism’s effectiveness has been demonstrated in the past. In 1995, the extremist group Aum Shinrikyo released sarin gas in a Tokyo subway, killing 13 and badly injuring over 50. In 2001, letters bearing anthrax spores arrived in the US Congress and media establishments, killing five and indisposing 17. An H5N1 outbreak would cause far greater havoc. The issue clearly highlights the need for upgraded global biosecurity and better safeguarding of deadly viruses in labs. Given the scientific community’s apparent failure to self-regulate against excesses, no-holds-barred experimentation must also be legislated against and violations punished. If experiments on or cloning of humans are outlawed as morally reprehensible, can spawning of man-made killer diseases be legitimate science?
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