Ten years after 9/11, the most hap pening topics of discussion remain terrorism, radicalisation, the homegrown variety of the two and measures to counter them. The Arab Spring is a more recent favourite followed by Anna Hazare and the American fall. Last month, in Tel Aviv, at the world's largest counter-terrorism summit, nearly 1300 experts from 50 countries collected to take stock and prevent the `Next Attack'. Surprisingly, AfPak, the epicentre was overlooked. India, its oldest and most serious victim, takes the scourge rather lightly, bearing the pain stoically.
Inside the International Institute for Counter Terrorism fluttered two flags: Those of the US and Israel, symbolising the strongest strategic partnership ever.
The US has lowered its goal from the global war on terrorism to focus on Al Qaeda, which last month planned its own commemoration of 9/11 by attempting terror attacks in the US, the UK, Germany and Sweden -which were all foiled. A pre-conference poll of 100 experts from 23 countries showed the following: One, 75 per cent believed that, if Iran gets nuclear weapons, terrorist attacks would increase; Two, only 22 per cent thought terror attacks were likely at present; Three, 47 per cent indicated the likelihood of terrorists obtaining nuclear weapons in the next seven years; Four, 78 per cent believed a nuclear attack by terrorists was unlikely; Five, 90 per cent believed cyber attacks were likely in the next five years; Six, 70 per cent said decline in terrorism post-Osama bin Laden was unlikely; Seven, 85 per cent concluded no progress was likely in the West Asia peace process for the next five years.
US President Barack Obama's counterterrorism doctrine reflects a conflict between national interest and moral values. At its core is making peace with a Muslim world reflected in the US President's visits to Turkey, Egypt and Indonesia and strengthening the view that a larger war cannot be won without the cooperation of the Muslims. Many believe Mr Obama's Cairo speech sparked the Jasmine Revolution.
Al Qaeda, which was formed in Peshawar in 1988 and has spawned 30 to 40 smaller groups, has changed from an operational to an ideological and training organisation sharing its vision and mission with the Muslim diaspora. While Al Qaeda has been diminished with the killing of several top leaders, the new outfits are homegrown terror cells, mushrooming in the Islamic Maghreb, the Arabian Peninsula, Nigeria and the West. In the US alone, 175 plots were foiled -50 per cent in the last three years.
Nearly a million people have been killed in the last ten years as a result of the overreaction to 9/11 in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere.
Counter-terrorism hinges on prevention -identification and monitoring of terror cells. In some parts of Europe, like in Netherlands, home-grown terrorism has diminished. Counter-terrorism measures have succeeded in the European Union due to cooperation in mainly the areas of intelligence sharing and best practices, but not enough is being done in counter-radicalisation. The nature of the terrorist threat is evolving due to a possible nuclear armed Iran and its virulent proxies, the fallout of the Arab Spring. The radicalisation of Turkey, the Palestinian claims of statehood in the UN, the likely reconciliation between Hamas and Fatah, growing radicalisation and the diminution of US influence.
Radicalisation in Western diasporas has grown through the distortion of religion and indoctrination. Equally, events in countries of origin have had a profound impact on the direction of extremist violence. Still, experts see the present indoctrination techniques as cut and paste and drive-by radicalisation.
Taliban's Baitullah Mehsud boasts, “Give me a ten-year old and in 15 minutes I will turn him into a suicide bomber“.
Taliban's Baitullah Mehsud boasts, “Give me a ten-year old and in 15 minutes I will turn him into a suicide bomber“.
Like on the issue of terrorism, there is no consensus on the definition of radicalisation. That terrorism is the peacetime equivalent of war crimes, only the Supreme Court of India has accepted, but which the UN has rejected.
While counter-radicalisation is addressing grievances, root — causes and also countering ideology, the tools of de-radicalisation are using ‘repentant terrorists’ , fatwas by clerics and dialogues by Government and academics in preventive engagement. The goal is to stop the ‘Next Attack’ .
Other incentives to terrorism are the ready flow of funds, failures of sanctions and difficulties in the prosecution of culprits. While it is clear that terrorists will not be made bankrupt, things have to be made difficult — processes like raising money, laundering it and preventing access. But it
is not easy. The LTTE is still raising $1 million annually in Canada mainly through extortion though the war was over two years ago. The Hizbullah collects $200 million annually through drugs and criminal activity. Taliban gets paid by the Afghan warlords, paid by the Americans to keep them at bay. This is in addition to drug money which fuels the insurgency.
While the hawala route is still effective, anti-money laundering measures are being circumvented by new payment technologies like mobile phones, prepaid cards, electronic purses, online PayPal payments etc.
Against individuals and organisations, sanctions have worked minimally and symbolically, like in the recent freezing of the bank accounts of four Haqqani group commanders. Organisations change designations. The Lashkar-e-Tayyeba morphed into the Jamait-ud-Dawa. Similarly, the process of filing suits against offenders has been frustrating, especially against Iran. The US courts have passed judgments against seven countries — Iran, Syria, Sudan, North Korea, Cuba, Iraq and Libya, but they are difficult to implement in another country due to ‘sovereign immunity’ . For example, judgments against Iran amount to $20 billion but there is no way of collecting compensation to deplete terrorist funds.
Ten years of violence and extremism have united various terrorist groups. While the Al Qaeda capabilities have been lowered, their motivation is intact. So, expect frequent and smaller attacks executed with cheaper and sophisticated technology. It is a hit-andmiss game. Faisal Shehzad’ s plot in New York was not foiled; it failed. Last month’s sting operation in the US pre-empted a drone attack against Pentagon. Israelis say their technology saved General Pervez Musharraf when the Jaish-e-Mohammad attempted to blow him up.
The West is considerably better off today than in 2001. But they have made sacrifices and tightened their Homeland Security.
India, unfortunately, is no better-off than when Parliament was struck in 2001.
Lessons have not been drawn from others’ experience. Much more needs to be done on home-grown terrorism, especially in dealing with outfits like SIMI and the Indian Mujahideen, which have links outside.
Political will and resources are needed to stop the ‘Next Attack’ .
(The accompanying visual is that of a Mumbai traffic policeman in the aftermath of the 26/11 terror attacks. Courtesy calamur.org)
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